And they said to him, “If you will be a servant to this people today and serve them, and speak good words to them when you answer them, then they will be your servants forever.”

-1 Kings 12:7, ESV

Boeing deserves its place among the greatest companies in American history.  In World War II, they filled the skies of Europe and the Pacific with the most iconic bombers of the era.  Their B-52 still soldiers on more than sixty years after entering service.  And after test pilot “Tex” Johnson barrel rolled one of their prototypes, Boeing defined the jet airliner.  But in recent years, Boeing has been plagued by various problems.  A fuselage door plug fell out of an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 9 in flight in early January.  Thankfully, there were no fatalities, but the incident sent shockwaves throughout the industry.  It was later discovered that four key bolts that should have held the plug in place had been missing since manufacture.  Since this was only a few short years after two Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashes that killed 346 people, this new issue is just more evidence that the giant has stumbled.  Where did Boeing go wrong, and what can be done about it? 

The Wrong Turn

Before we identify the root cause of Boeing’s current woes, it is important to exclude something that is definitely not the root cause. Various people on the Right have suggested that an emphasis on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion at Boeing and their subcontractor Spirit AeroSystems is a significant contributing factor, that hiring for diversity rather than ability has resulted in a workforce lacking the competence for the work required. The short-sighted corporate culture we are about to discuss makes it likely that some employees at both companies—just as with all companies espousing or supporting “woke” ideology—were hired more for their demographics than their abilities. However, any role this has played in the current crisis appears negligible. As we will soon see, Boeing went off course long before the concept of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion became mainstream. 

For most of its history, Boeing has been an engineer’s company, emphasizing safety, quality, technical excellence, and innovation above profit and costs.  This earned them a stellar reputation with their customers and the traveling public, so that their slogan “If it’s not a Boeing, I’m not going” rang true.  It was this culture that produced the airliner that defined the shape of all modern airliners (707), the most popular airliner ever (737), most iconic airliner ever (747), and most popular wide-body airliner ever (777).  But that culture began to erode when Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in 1997.  On the surface, the merger seemed perfect, with McDonnell Douglas bringing significant strength in the space and defense sectors.  Both original companies—especially Douglas—also had long and storied histories.  In fact, the plane that made airline travel practical in the first place was the Douglas DC-3.  Almost ninety years after it entered service, the DC-3 is still going strong in some of the harshest places on earth.  The merger of such companies should have sent Boeing nowhere but up.  However, the cultural differences between the two would start Boeing down the path that has produced today’s problems. 

At the time of the merger, McDonnell Douglas emphasized costs and short-term profit, especially some senior executives who were disciples of legendary General Electric CEO Jack Welch.  He was credited with lifting GE out of the doldrums to unparalleled success, causing many to emulate his leadership philosophy.  Only decades later has industry realized just how toxic that philosophy was.  His focus was all about short-term profits, especially his infamous “rank and yank” system.  Every year, all managers would be ranked based on the shareholder value their team generated.  The top twenty percent would be rewarded and the bottom ten percent fired.[1]  Another hallmark of this strategy was the frequent use of layoffs to boost shareholder value.  Anyone familiar with W. Edwards Deming’s Red Bead Experiment will immediately see the flaws in this strategy.  But it made GE successful, right?  Actually, this is a case in which correlation does not imply causation.  First, much of the success of GE during Jack Welch’s tenure was due to timing.  This was the 80s and 90s, so the whole market was doing well.  During this time, GE’s performance was basically in line with the market as a whole.[2]  Second, much of GE’s success during this period was from GE Capital rather than their core industrial business.[3]  So the performance that Jack Welch so relentlessly sought after and that so many tried so hard to emulate really wasn’t outstanding at all.  In exchange for that basically average performance Welch traded the culture of GE, destroying trust and thereby causing immense long-term damage.[4]  By the time Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merged in 1997, that culture had taken hold of McDonnell Douglas, so when many of the senior leaders from McDonnell Douglas took key positions in Boeing, that culture began to spread throughout Boeing.  Senior leaders who had technical knowledge and experience were replaced by those with a financial background instead.  Then in 2005, Boeing moved their corporate headquarters from Seattle to Chicago, thus geographically separating the senior decision-makers from the technical workers by seventeen hundred miles and two time zones.  Before long, cost-cutting and profit eclipsed safety and quality, especially as regular layoffs became common.  They became the driving factor on all strategic decisions, especially in the 737 MAX development.  Under pressure to compete with the Airbus A320neo and lacking time to develop a completely new aircraft, Boeing chose to adapt the 737.  They promised their customers that the differences between the types would be so small that only a quick iPad-based training course would be needed.  This dictate forced a dramatic change to the control system that was not adequately communicated to anyone—a systems engineering failure that will serve as a case study in engineering schools worldwide for years to come.  Thus design flaw—enabled by poor engineering practices that were all but mandated by the short-term, profit-over-safety culture—caused the two crashes that killed 346 people. 

But now, just a few short years after the 737 MAX control issues were fixed, we see a systemic manufacturing issue.  Somehow, a 737 MAX 9 made it all the way through production missing four critical bolts, with the issue remaining undiscovered until the door plug they were supposed to be holding in place flew off in flight.  As with all 737s, the fuselage in question was manufactured by Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas—part of Boeing until after the McDonnell Douglas merger—then transported by train to Boeing’s 737 plant in Renton, Washington.  According to the preliminary NTSB report, upon arrival at Boeing, the door plug had to be removed to repair some rivets.  Spirit AeroSystems employees finished the repair, but the bolts were not reinstalled.  The fuselage then went all the way through production and into interior installation without being noticed.  It is anyone’s guess how many people were in that area working on various things who had an opportunity to notice the problem but didn’t.  How is this possible? 

This occurred for much the same reason as the two nuclear incidents discussed previously: the corporate culture allowed it.  In addition to the emphasis on cutting costs, there was an immense schedule pressure—which has been the case for many years.  As the only major suppliers of medium to large airliners, Boeing and Airbus both have backlogs that can reach upwards of a decade, which puts significant pressure on the workers to build and deliver aircraft as quickly as possible.  In recent years this is especially the case at Boeing, which is trying not only to ramp up production to pre-pandemic levels, but is also preparing to scale up 737 MAX production.  This pressure was a significant factor in this most recent crisis.  But despite this pressure, Boeing—like GE when Jack Welch took over—was in a comfortable spot.  Though they compete with each other, Boeing and Airbus make up a duopoly that controls the market, so they are both essentially “too big to fail”.  Sadly, this most recent incident shows that not even the deaths of 346 people could motivated Boeing to abandon their profit-centric model in favor of the safety and quality emphasis that made them a household name in the first place.  As with many companies, they have put shareholders ahead of customers ahead of employees, and despite crisis after crisis they have maintained that priority.  If they do not radically change this immediately, this company that is “too big to fail” may go the way of the dodo bird.

Correcting the Course

Boeing is clearly far off course from both their heritage and where they need to be to maintain public confidence.  What can they do to correct that course?  This is an enterprise-level problem, so only an enterprise-level solution will make any difference.  This is not an issue of a few bad apples or even a bad barrel, since two separate “barrels”—design and manufacturing—have proven to be flawed.  Finding and firing the workers who neglected to reinstall the bolts or those who were supposed to inspect their work will do no good.  Neither will a “safety stand-down”, a revamp of the quality program, flashy slogans, slowed production, a sorrowful speech from the CEO, bringing in consultants, or any of the other quick fixes companies often try to apply in these situations.  Only a radical cultural transformation can save Boeing—starting. at the very top.  Boeing must invert their priorities to place employees first, then customers, then shareholders.  Their current commitment to shareholder supremacy is literally putting lives at risk. 

Instead, if they prioritize taking care of their employees, the employees will take care of the customers, which will naturally result in taking care of the shareholders.  This is true of any business, but especially for building airliners—which is incredibly complex and must be done mostly by hand, requiring immense skill and craftsmanship.  It has been likened to the skill required to cook gourmet meals in a Michelin star restaurant, whereas Boeing is trying to apply fast food-style techniques in order to cut costs and speed up delivery.  After a quarter century, this philosophy clearly isn’t working and customers are not pleased.  Recently, the CEO of Emirates—a prolific user of both Boeing and Airbus widebody airliners—said that Boeing is in the “last chance saloon” and needs to make drastic changes.  He is not alone in this sentiment, so Boeing needs to alter their course immediately before they alienate their customers and employees alike. 

The radical transformation needed at Boeing will require an equally radical transformation in Boeing’s senior leadership.  The events of the past several years—and the fact that Boeing moved their headquarters even farther east to Arlington, Virginia—show that there is a serious disconnect between Boeing’s leaders and workers.  This is reminiscent of Israel’s King Rehoboam.  Like Boeing’s current leader, he inherited and impressive heritage.  His father Solomon has ruled over the most prosperous period in Israel’s history, but his massive projects and decadent lifestyle took their toll on the people, so they asked Rehoboam to lighten their load.  The wise men who had advised his father told him, “If you will be a servant to this people today and serve them, and speak good words to them when you answer them, then they will be your servants forever” (1 Kings 12:7).  Essentially, they were recommending servant leadership, which I discuss in my leadership paper. But he ignored them, instead following the advice of his peers—who had likely also grown up in affluence without having to work to earn it.  They stroked his ego much like those around Haman—with similarly disastrous results.  Arrogantly declaring that he would increase the burden on the people, he ultimately sparked a rebellion that split the kingdom in two. 

Boeing now faces a similar choice: they can serve their employees and focus on equipping them to build the safest and most high-quality airliners in the world or they can double-down on their employee-betraying profit quest that will likely cause their destruction.  Though the path will be difficult, the right choice is clear: Boeing needs to abandon their short-term focus and adopt an infinite rather than finite mindset and resurrect their culture from before the merger.  They must prioritize safety, quality, technical excellence, and innovation above profit, cost, and schedule.  They must do away with the frequent layoffs and instead focus on building a culture of trust with employees that is absolutely necessary for quality.  And they must export this culture to their suppliers as well.  This transformation will take several years and sharply cut into profits in the short-term, so for now Boeing needs to stop caring about their stock value.  Wise investors will understand this and stick with Boeing, knowing that as with many such transitions the stock will ultimately performing better than before.[5]  Perhaps it is possible for the current Boeing senior leaders to lead this transformation, but it is more likely that new leadership will be necessary.  The success of this transformation depends on servant leaders who are willing to take great personal and professional risks in pursuit of caring for their people and advancing their long-term vision.  If the current leaders are not up for the challenge, they should be replaced by leaders who are. 

In the meantime, is it safe to fly on Boeing aircraft?  As an aerospace engineer with over a decade of experience in the broader aviation field, I would not hesitate to ride on Boeing aircraft.  The airline industry in the West is full of safety redundancy and high maintenance standards.  When issues like this are found, appropriate steps are taken to identify and correct the root cause, making aviation safer in the process.  Robust maintenance practices can mitigate many safety concerns while Boeing works to correct their course, and if Boeing is successful in returning to the culture of excellence that was the stuff of legend prior to the merger, they may well be able to restore the truth of their old slogan “if it’s not a Boeing, I’m not going”.  It will be a hard road for Boeing, but it is quite possible and equally necessary.

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[1] Simon Sinek, Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don’t: New York, NY: Portfolio: 2017: 210.

[2] Simon Sinek, Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don’t: New York, NY: Portfolio: 2017: 211; Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap…And Others Don’t, New York, NY: HarperCollins: 2001: 33.

[3] Simon Sinek, Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don’t: New York, NY: Portfolio: 2017: 211.

[4] Simon Sinek, The Infinite Game, New York, NY: Portfolio: 2019: 110.

[5] For examples of such transformations, see Simon Sinek, The Infinite Game, New York, NY: Portfolio: 2019.